NOTICE: THIS OPINION
IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL
UNTIL TIME EXPIRES FOR REHEARING OR FURTHER APPELLATE
REVIEW AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
Review Quasi-Judicial Action, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles: DRIVER’S
LICENSES – implied consent warning – inconsistencies in the evidence – Florida Statutes,
section 316.1932(1)(a), requires that the implied consent warning be given
before driver is requested to submit to a breath test – when the testimony and
evidence presented to the hearing officer gives equal support to inconsistent
references, there is not competent substantial evidence to support a valid
refusal – documents and testimony of officers were inconsistent as to when
implied consent warning was given - Petition granted. Ojiem v. Dept. of Highway
Safety and Motor Vehicles, No. 07-0059AP-88B (
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND
APPELLATE DIVISION
ABSALOM OJIEM,
Petitioner,
vs. Appeal No. 07-0059AP-88B
UCN522007AP000059XXXXCV
STATE OF
HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,
Respondent.
____________________________________________/
THIS
CAUSE came before the Court on the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the
Response, and the Reply. Upon consideration of the briefs, the record, and being
otherwise fully advised, the Court finds that the Petition must be granted as
set forth below.
The Petitioner, Absalom Ojiem (Ojiem),
seeks review of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision, entered September
7, 2007, in which the Respondent, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles
(Department), sustained the suspension of his driving privilege for driving
under the influence. The standard of
review is whether the petitioner was afforded procedural due process, whether
the essential requirements of law were observed, and whether the Department’s
findings and judgment are supported by competent substantial evidence. See Vichich v. Department of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 799 So.2d 1069, 1073 (
After a formal review hearing, the hearing
officer made the following findings of fact:
On July 18, 2007, the petitioner was
operating a motor vehicle. Officer
Anthony Citrano of the Largo Police Department arrived and made contact with
the petitioner. Officer Citrano smelled
a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on the petitioner’s breath and noticed
that his eyes were watery and bloodshot and that he was unsteady on his
feet. Officer Citrano asked the
petitioner to perform Field Sobriety Task [sic]
of which he performed poorly and was subsequently arrested for DUI. The petitioner was transported to jail and
was read implied consent. The petitioner
refused to submit to a breath test.
The record shows that Officer Leuallen, of
the Largo Police Department, stopped a black Dodge vehicle after observing the
Dodge traveling erratically without its headlights on. Officer Leuallen made contact with the
driver, identified as Ojiem, and noticed that Ojiem smelled of alcohol, that
his eyes were glassy, and that he was not alert. As Ojiem looked for his driver’s license,
Officer Leuallen had to instruct him to put his vehicle in park and shut the
vehicle off as it began to roll backwards.
Ojiem did not realize he was driving without his headlights on. Officer Citrano was then called to conduct a
DUI investigation. As soon as Officer
Citrano approached Ojiem, Ojiem requested an attorney. Officer Citrano explained that he was only
going to ask Ojiem a few questions.
Ojiem needed assistance to get out of his vehicle, almost losing one of
his shoes. Ojiem again asked for an
attorney to which Officer Citrano responded that he was not entitled to an
attorney before performing the field sobriety tests. Ojiem had difficulty understanding the “walk
and turn” and did not to perform this task.
Ojiem performed the remaining tasks poorly and was placed under arrest
for DUI.
Officer
Citrano’s Narrative states that, while he was walking Ojiem over to his
cruiser, he requested him to provide a breath sample to which Ojiem once again
stated that he wanted an attorney and did not understand the request. Ojiem became hostile and the taser was used
three times before Ojiem was secured and then transported to the central breath
testing facility. The Narrative
explains: “Once on scene at Central
Breath Testing Facility the subject again refused to provide a breath
sample. The subject was read Implied
Consent and I filled out the appropriate documentation, following all state
guidelines, department policies and procedures.” Because of chest pains, Ojiem was taken to
At
the review hearing, several documents were admitted into evidence. Officer Leuallen’s citation for driving
without headlights indicates that Ojiem committed the infraction at 10:02
p.m. Officer Citrano’s Arrest Affidavit
shows that Ojiem was arrested at approximately 2102,
or 9:02 p.m. The Vital Signs document,
offered into evidence by Ojiem during the review hearing, shows that Ojiem’s
vital signs were first recorded at 8:51 p.m. and last recorded at 1:25
a.m. The Breath Alcohol Test Affidavit
shows that the observation period began at 2201, or
10:01 p.m. The Affidavit of Refusal to
Submit to Breath, Urine, or Blood Test shows that Ojiem was arrested at
approximately 2148, or 9:48 p.m. and that, at 2231, or 10:31, Ojiem was
informed of the implied consent warning and refused the breath test.
At
the hearing, Officer Leuallen testified that she stopped Ojiem at approximately
9:30 p.m., the time given in her Supplemental Narrative. Office Leuallen
remembered Officer Citrano taking out the implied consent card and reading it
to Ojiem in front of the camera in his cruiser before Ojiem was transported to
the breath testing facility.[1] Officer Leuallen first testified that she
could not recall if the consent warning was read before or after Officer
Citrano asked Ojiem to submit to a breath test.
Officer Leuallen then testified that the request to take the breath test
was prior to Ojiem being placed under arrest for DUI and that Ojiem asked for
an attorney a second time after being stunned by the taser.
Officer Citrano testified that he read the
implied consent warning twice to the Petitioner:
I read implied consent twice, in the field on
video and once we get [sic] to the
central breath testing when the instrument is ready and they’re finally able to
give a sample. If they refuse, I read
them implied consent as I mark refusal.
It is actually done twice.
Officer Citrano explained that he read Ojiem
implied consent at the location of the traffic stop after Ojiem was placed
under arrest for DUI, but that he did not put it in his report. Ojiem did not explicitly refuse to take the
breath test, rather “kept saying he wanted a lawyer,” which Officer Citrano
took as a refusal. Officer Citrano also
testified that Ojiem, who is a citizen of
After
the officers testified, the formal review hearing was continued so that Ojiem
could testify. Ojiem testified that he
was asked to submit to a breath test after he finished the field sobriety
tests. Ojiem did not understand the
request and he wanted to speak with an attorney. Ojiem stated that he was not informed of
implied consent. About 20 minutes after
he arrived at the central breath testing facility, Ojiem was taken to
Before this Court, Ojiem argues
that the Department erred in not setting aside his license suspension as the
record lacks competent substantial evidence that Ojiem refused the breath test
after being informed of the implied consent law. Under the facts of this case, the Court
finds that certiorari relief must be granted as the evidence and testimony are
inconsistent as to when the implied consent warning was given. The implied consent warning must be given
before the driver is requested to submit to a breath test. See
The critical determination of when or whether the motorist was given the consent warning required by law as a predicate for the conclusion that she refused to submit to the test, thereby leading to a suspension of the license, was supported only by evidence that gives equal support to inconsistent references, and as such can hardly be deemed so sufficiently reliable that a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to support the conclusion reached. The hearing officer’s finding that Trimble was given a consent warning before her refusal could have rested as much on the flip of a coin as on the documentary evidence submitted.[2]
The issue presented in this case was addressed by this Court in Cellamare v. State, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 14 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 908 (Fla. 6th Cir. App. Ct. April 13, 2007), wherein the Court relied on Trimble in concluding that the order of license suspension had to be quashed since there were inconsistencies as to when the implied consent warning had been given. The Court found the burden was on the Department to provide live sworn testimony to resolve any discrepancies in the evidence.
Unlike Cellamare, there was live sworn testimony presented by Officer Leuallen and Officer Citrano. However, their testimony was conflicting and did not resolve the issue of when the implied consent warning was given to Ojiem. Even excluding the vital signs document, the evidence and testimony presented gave equal support to inconsistent references. Therefore, like Cellamare and Trimble, there is not competent substantial evidence to support a valid refusal.
Therefore, it is,
ORDERED
AND ADJUDGED that the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari is granted and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision
is quashed.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, at
______________________________
AMY M. WILLIAMS
Circuit Judge, Appellate Division
_______________________ _____________________________
PETER
RAMSBERGER J.
THOMAS McGRADY
Circuit Judge, Appellate Division Circuit Judge, Appellate Division
Copies furnished to:
Ricardo Rivera, Esquire
Thomas C. Mielke, Assistant General Counsel
DHSMV, Legal Department – Room A-432
Bureau of Administrative Reviews
[1] The record shows that both Officer Leuallen and Officer Citrano recorded the stop and arrest of Ojiem. Neither video was admitted into evidence and so is not included in the appendices.
[2]
The facts analyzed in Trimble were: the refusal affidavit stated that Trimble was
arrested for DUI at 11:40 p.m. on September 27, 2000; at 12:45 a.m., on
September 27, 2000, a request was made for Trimble to submit to a breath test;
the Breathalyzer print-out reflects a refusal at 12:47 a.m. on the 27th, and;
the officer’s narrative states that the consent warning was given to Trimble at
12:50 a.m. on the 27th. See Trimble,
821 So.2d at 1086.